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I. Tm PRINCIPLE OF THE SHERMAN LAw
Direct social control of the industrial system presents dismaying difficulties and
dangers. The National Recovery Administration revealed the complexity of the
economic problems that arise when conflicts of self interest are replaced by direct
governmental planning. The political consequences of a high concentration of
economic power in the state are less clear but no less disquieting. Efforts to meet the
growing criticism of the industrial system while avoiding these difficulties and
dangers" have taken a peculiar form in the United States. An effort has been made
to preserve by law the conditions necessary for the continuance of competition. If
the prerequisites of competition could be preserved detailed controls of industrial
policy would, it was hoped, be avoided. Direct appraisal of the treatment of the
buyer would be unnecessary. Experience of this policy has, however, revealed the
difficulty of giving specific meaning to the comfortable phrase of the economists,
"assuming free competition." It has brought disillusionment because of the increas-
ingly wide divergence of actual business conditions from the free competition of
economic theory. In consequence social policy shows signs of transformation into
a policy of regulating an admittedly imperfectly competitive world.
The prerequisites of competition have recently been reexamined by economists
and prove to be very difficult of attainment. There must be a perfect market in the
sense that, in the absence of general changes in the conditions of demand and supply,
a slight reduction in price by one firm would shift all business in the market to that
firm. Buyers may have no loyalties to sellers or preferences for the product of any
one of them and they must be exceedingly well informed. Selleis must be sufficiently
numerous for none of them to find it profitable to take account of the effect of
changes in his output upon the market price.
4B.Sc. (Econ), 1920; Fh.D., 1926, University of London. Assistant Professor of Economics, Faculty of
Political Science, Columbia University. Author of The Decline of Competition (1936).
' Centralized control of monetay policy has been increasingly relied upon during the present century
to provide a broad control of the industrial system without direct and detailed interference with initiative.
Marriner S. Eccles, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, has now, however, declared that the Federal
Reserve System is powerless to maintain a stable economy unless othet essentially non-monetary factors
necesary to stability are brought into line either by private interests or the government. Statement in
N. Y. Timex, March 16, z937, p. 9.
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The Sherman Act,2 the first federal anti-trust law, was passed in response to
evidence that business was evolving away from these conditions. Market control
had been obtained in some industries by the concentration of a large proportion of
the business in single firms. In others, firms had become sufficiently few to get
together in pools and agree upon prices. Two major explanations of these tendencies
were possible. On the one hand, they might be attributed to changes in technology.
Business men competing with each other in the effort to utilize the most economical
methods of production had developed firms large enough to make it necessary for
them to take account of their power over the market price. Where goods are costly
to transport the markets of firms are not nationwide; even where there are many
firms in the country as a whole there may be few in each local market. This expla-
nation suggests that competition has in fact frequently proved to be self-destructive.
Efforts to maintain the prerequisites of competition in these circumstances would not
yield the fruits of competition which are the ultimate objective of social policy. If
large firms are the most economical, any limitation, direct or indirect, upon oppor-
tunities to attain the most economical size hamper the initiative of individuals and
obstruct the utilization of the most economical methods of production.
The alternative explanation of the declining numbers of firms is that they have
increased in size by resort to tactics which have little relation to their economies in
production. This interpretation of the events between the Civil War and i89o sug-
gested changes in law to prevent resort to these practices. Only the fittest would
then survive and they would be numerous enough to satisfy the requirements of
competition. Such appears to be the basis of the Sherman Law. It raises the ques-
tion why a moral lapse should have occurred soon after the Civil War, and suggests
to the enquiring mind the possibility that it may have been connected with the
revolution in methods of transportation which widened markets and facilitated
the utilization of large scale methods of production. Drastic methods were un-
doubtedly used, but they may have been due to the great economies in production
methods then made available if rapid industrial concentration could be effected. The
survival of large firms since that time and the rise of others suggest that they have
maintained themselves either because of superior efficiency or because of continued
buccanering tactics. Either the Sherman Law has failed as a means of eliminating
these tactics or the economies of large scale production have been very important.
But with the latter conclusion we return to the first explanation of the decline of the
competitive market.
II. PRICE COMPETITION VNDER THE SHERMAN ACr AND FEDEAL TRADE COMMISSION ACrs
A. Price Policies
The attempt by law to preserve the competitive market was expressed in a con-
demnation of contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of interstate com-
merce. Monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, or combining or conspiring
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. SSx-7.
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to monopolize any part of interstate commerce was similarly declared illegal. By
the courts "it has repeatedly been held ... that the purpose of the statute is to
maintain free competition in interstate commerce.' 3  Behind the assumptions of free
competition by the economists lay an assumption of the existence of private property.
Congress was faced with the problem of writing a commercial code determining
the precise set of rights and duties which would constitute the kind of private
property necessary to produce the results of competition. By the vague wording
of the statute it passed this problem to the courts. In the course of their efforts to
solve the problem they were presented with the question whether certain price
policies were in violation of the assumption of free competition. They have con-
sistently refused to appraise price policies in terms of profits. Had they not taken
this position they would speedily have been involved in the regulation of prices and
the problems presented by such regulation in the industries which they have decided
to be affected with a public interest. They have, however, sought to test price
policies in terms of the intentions of the parties. An intent to drive out a rival
is evidence of attempts to restrain trade or create a monopoly.4 The basic difficulty
of this policy lies in the,vagueness and even inappropriateness of the criterion of
intent. In times when speedy concentration of industry is induced by recognition
of the economies of large scale production price cutting tactics may be drastic enough
to persuade the court that it smells an evil intent. But the attainment of the econ-
omies of mass production may be the ultimate inducement to adopt such policies.
Not all buccaneering tactics can be excused on this basis but the touchstone used by
the court does not distinguish the vigorous pursuit of the economies of size from the
vigorous pursuit of monopoly profits.
The policy of the courts tends to encourage the attainment of the economies of
production by other methods than price cutting. In general they have been un-
willing to interfere with mergers or to break up very large firms.5 The smaller
firms instead of being driven out tend to be bought out with consequent advantage
to their owners but not necessarily to the consumer. 6 Concentration has, therefore,
not been prevented and price behavior in sharp contrast with that in the competitive
market has appeared. "When the courts have been presented with evidence of such
" American Column and Lumber Co. V. U. S., 257 U. S. 377, 400 (921). Cf. "The theory of the
anti-trust laws in their modern orientation is that, in the absence of adequate governmental control upon
a monopolistic basis, the influence of government should be exercised to keep the markets free to all on
a competitive basis." McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (936) IowA L. REV. 302.
'The price wars in the tobacco industry were regarded as contributory evidence of intent to monopolize.
U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. xo6 (i955). The intent of the Corn Products Refining Com-
pany to monopolize was inferred in part from sales below cost and the company was forbidden to resort
to low price campaigns. U. S. v. Corn Prodzcts Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). The
Steel Corporation was held to be a "good trust" partly because it had not indulged in secret price cutting.
U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 47 (ig2o). The contention that the International Harvester Com-
pany had not used its power to restrain trade was supported by the claim that it had not reduced prices
below cost for the purpose of driving out competitors. U. S. v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693
(1927).
5 Even where firms have been broken up the number in the market has frequently remained small.
" Cf. Burns, The Process of Industrial Concentration (1933) 47 Q. J. EcoN. 277.
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contrasts they have not regarded it as evidence of the failure of the policy of main-
taining the prerequisites of competition. The Supreme Court dismissed with brusque
contempt.evidence that the price of steel rails had been stable for many years,7 and
in the same case it declared that "the law does not make mere size an offence. '8
Likewise it has held that price leadership "does not establish any suppression of
competition or show any sinister domination. '9
The policy of maintaining the prerequisites of competition by the control of
industrial practices also provides the foundation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act."° This act empowered the Federal Trade Commission to prevent unfair meth-
ods of competition. The Commission has also made a few, but none too successful,
attempts to deal with price policies regarded as unfair. Apart from the cases con-
cerning price discrimination which were taken under the authority of both the
Claytonioa and Federal Trade Commission Acts it has made little progress in estab-
lishing a criterion of fairness in price policies. It ordered a large distributor to cease
selling sugar at a loss during the war, the sales being in combination with other
sales, but it was not upheld by the court.' l It ordqed a seller to cease selling at less
than the price charged by a rival on the ground that the price was not set in good
faith.12 The acceptance by the Commission in 1928 and 1929 of Trade Practice Con-
ference rules against less than cost selling indicates pressure for such rules and the
willingness of the Commission to condemn the practice.',
B. Cooperative Control of Prices or Output
Agreements between sellers concerning prices and output have generally been
condemned without regard for the reasonableness of the policy pursued. The Su-
preme Court has stated that it would hesitate, in the absence of express legislation,
to make the difference between legal and illegal business relations "depend upon so
uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can be made
only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice between
rival philosophies."'14 Nevertheless, some six years later the Court retired from this
position and decided that "the mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate
U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
'1d. at 451.
"U. S. v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 709 (1927).
1038 STAT. 717 (94), 15 U. S. C. §§41-s. 2°438 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§13-x3a.
'F. T. C. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., z F. T. C. 163 (1918), 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 9th, xgxg). The
court held that the Commission had no power t6 proceed against sales below cost but that misrepresenta-
tion in connection with such sales was illegal.
"F. T. C. v. The Oakes Co., 3 F' T. C. 36 (1920).
'NAT. INDusTRIAL CoNF. Bo., TE PuBaLo REGULAT5ON OF COMPETMTv PcrTcEs (1925) 64. In
both policy and form of administration the Commission anticipated the subsequent National Recovery
Administration.
'U. S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 398 (1927). "The power to fix prices, whether
reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable
prices." Id. at 397. Conditions may change and a price once reasonable may be maintained and become
unreasonable. If power to fix prices depended upon tho reasonableness of the prices the government, in
enforcing the Sherman Law, would be compelled to shoulder the "burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions." Id. at 398
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competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it."'15 The Court took
into account the peculiar nature of the bituminous coal industry, its excess capacity,
its difficulties in meeting the competition of oil, gas, and water power, and its
"chaotic condition." "The fact that the correction of abuses would lead to fairer
price levels does not mean that abuses should go uncorrected or that cooperative
endeavor to correct them necessarily constitutes an unreasonable restraint of frade."'
The establishment of a cooperative selling agency including a large number of the
sellers in one field was held, therefore, not to be illegal. But the Court provided that
the case should remain open so that evidence of any attempt by the agency to abuse
its position might be brought before it. Apparently in this case the Court, in-
terpreting the Sherman Act, has embarked upon a journey towards the control of
prices, although that control is indirect and tentative.
III. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
During the past decade the courts have been called upon to decide whether a
seller may, without contravening the Sherman or Federal Trade Commission Acts,
control the price at which his product is resold by the buyer. The very existence of
the problem on a scale stimulating litigation is an indication that the prerequisites
of competition have not been preserved on the selling side of the market. In fact
the imperfections of competition between sellers have been tacitly accepted and
policy has been framed partly in terms of the forms of business organization and
partly in terms of the control of the policies of sellers in imperfect competition with
each other in the hope of maintaining the prerequisites of competition at the next
stage in the distributive process. Decision in terms of forms of organization has,
however, enfeebled efforts by manufacturers to maintain competition at the next
stage by restricting them to a variety of not entirely effective methods. At this next
stage, however, there has been in process a reorganization which has threatened with
expulsion small scale distributors and their suppliers. These threatened groups
have recently induced legislation giving more effective power to manufacturers of
branded consumer goods to preserve the lives of small scale distributors. Thus the
imperfection of competition at one stage is not only accepted but utilized with the
object of maintaining the number of distributors. The control of the organization
of distribution is coming, therefore, to rest pardy in the hands of manufacturers.
The efforts of the courts to rest their decisions upon legal forms rather than
economic consequences are indicated in a brief series of cases. Contracts providing
for price maintenance are held to be contrary to the Sherman Law because they
restrain trade between the buyers.' 7  The same result is beyond the reach of the
law if the manufacturcr merely urges retailers to maintain suggested prices, an-
nounces that dealers failing to maintain these prices will be denied supplies and
'Appalachian Coals Inc. v. U. S. 288 U. S. 344, 36o (1933).
" Id. at 374.
17Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911); Bauer et Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229
U. S. 1 (1913).
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requests information concerning price cutters.' Keeping records concerning the
behavior of dealers and employing systematic devices for detecting price cutting have
been held to approach so nearly in effectiveness to contractual covenants eliminating
price competition between dealers as to contravene the Federal Trade Commission
Act."" But when the dealer is constituted an agent of the manufacturer, the latter
is left free to control the resale price without contravening the law.20
The constitutionality of legislation specifically authorizing manufacturers to set
minimum resale prices has recently been affirmed by the Supreme Court.2 1 The
decision rests upon the contention that the distributors owned the commodity but
not the brand name. They were fee to sell the commodity without identifying
labels or containers at any price they chose (not a very real alternative). Whether
price cutting in the sale of trademarked products was injurious to the goodwill of
the producer was "fairly open to differences of opinion" but if states decided that
goodwill was thus damaged the method of protection selected was not unconstitu-
tional.22
The imperfection of competition .among manufacturers rests largely upon the
use of advertising to break up the market into a series of submarkets. Each of these
submarkets is occupied by one manufacturer and separated from other submarkets
by the preferences of buyers for one product rather than another. The absence of
such advertising is, therefore, one of the prerequisites of competition. The sellers of
unbranded goods in competition are powerless to exact the maintenance of resale
prices. The decision of the Court indicates, however, that it realizes that laws per-
mitting resale price maintenance encourage the building up of goodwill by adver-
'U. S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (g99); U. S. v. Schraders Sons, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920).
"Beech Nut Packing Company v. F. T. C., 257 U. S. 441 (1922); Cream of Wheat Co. v. F. T. C.,
X4 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
='U. S. v. General Electric CO., 272 U. S. 476 (r926). The Court seeks, however, by examination of
the contracts, to ensure that a genuine agency is established. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston
Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922); Butterick Co. v. F. T. C., 4 F. (2d) 910 (1925), cert. denied, 267 U. S. 602
(1925). CI. BURNS, THE DECLINE Oa CoMPsTrinoN (x936), 420.
' Old Dearborn Distributing Corp. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (936). The state of
Illinois had passed a "Fair Trade Act" providing that no cohtract for the sale or resale of branded goods
in "fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others" should be
illegal because it contained either of the following provisions: (a) That the buyer would not resell except
at a price stipulated by the seller; (b) That the product should not be further resold except at a price
stipulated by the producer or first purchaser. Such piovisions in any contract were, by the Act, deemed
to imply that the commodity might be sold without reference to the contract in three situations, viz,,
(i) When the owner of the commodity was closing out his stock "for the purpose of discontinuing delivery
of any such commodity" provided that the stock was offered to the manufacturer at the original invoice
price at least ten days before its sale to the public; (2) When goods were damaged or deteriorated and
the public was so informed; (3) When they were sold by an officer acting under the authority of any
court. The Act further prohibited wilfully and knowingly offering for sale or selling any commodity at
less than the price stipulated "in any contract" pursuant to the above provisions of the Act whether or not
the person so advertising or selling was a party to the contract. The Act did not authorise contracts between
producers, between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale prices.
' It was contended on behalf of the daler that he had been deprived of the right to dispose of his
property at any price he might choose. The court blandly replied that, while there would have been
constitutional objection to the annexation by the state of this right to fix the price, there was none when
the right was transferred from dealer to manufacturer under legislative sanction.
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tising. In supporting resale price maintenance state governments and the courts
are, therefore, departing from the traditional policy of maintaining competition.
They are facilitating the replacement of price competition among manufacturers by
competition in advertising.
The struggle between large and small scale organization of distribution has taken
the form partly of price competition. The large scale distributors desire freeddm to
cut resale prices as they may choose. The small scale retailers and their suppliers
desire the maintenance of margins that will enable them to survive. If they organize
and apply pressure to manufacturers the latter must choose between the large and
the small distributors. But the manufacturers are not impartial in this choice. They
advertise partly because they are anxious to keep in their own hands some control
over the promotion of the sales of their product. They are also fearful of the
emergence of small numbers of large distributors who may overpower them. The
net outcome of this situation is, therefore, likely to be that manufacturers will
endeavor to maintain large numbers of small distributors. By doing so they may
prevent the reorganization of distribution upon what may be a more economical
basis. High cost distribution, in the form of too many too small outlets, may sur-
vive in the interests both of manufacturers and of those threatened with expulsion
by the larger firms. Manufacturers are, however, faced with the possibility that the
large distributors will establish brands of their own or that they will evade resale
price maintenance by combination sales or trade-ins.
The argument that increases in the size of firms are due to unfair practices has
arisen in the course of the struggle between large and small distributors. Although
resale price maintenance laws go far beyond the exclusion of "loss leaders" these
leaders are frequently used as the main justification for the law. "Loss leaders" are
condemned by manufacturers who promote their product by advertising. They
are irked by the fact that the large distributors find it more profitable to reduce
the resale prices of well advertised commodities especially if they have a stated price
(e.g., books) than to use other articles as loss leaders. Buyers can make a simple
and direct comparison between the cost of the branded goods at large and small
stores. Where goods vary in quality and style comparison is a task usually beyond
the powers, or even the time, of the retail buyer. By using advertised products as
loss leaders large distributors gain a reputation for general low prices more quickly
and cheaply than by cutting all prices. Loss leaders may, therefore, be a means of
deceiving the buyer into an unjustified belief that a particular store is a cheap store.
In so far as distributors recover a smaller mark-up on loss leaders than on other
mcrchandise there may be price discrimination, although it is discriinination be-
tween groups of buyers. Whether or not it constitutes discrimination in fact depends
upon the possibility of discovering the correct distribution of the cost of operating
a store between dealings in different products and this is an almost impossible task.
23
'Fast moving items like loss leaders can, of course, be handled for a smaller mark-up than slow
moving ones without reduction of profit. -
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Where the dealer handles the product without any mark-up or even resells at a price
less than he pays discrimination is undeniable. The dealer argues that this policy
is an alternative to advertising and can properly claim that, unlike almost all other
forms of advertising, it results in direct gains to the consumer. Moreover, in so far
as his policy is deceptive, it can hardly be placed upon a lower plane than a great
deal of advertising, most of which raises costs while loss leaders reduce prices. Loss
leaders can also be attacked because they represent a temporary policy. Distributors
are apt to turn for loss leaders from one product to another. The manufacturer
claims that there is no economy in these temporary dislocations of his machinery for
distribution. Smaller dealers are discouraged from handling the product during
the period of price cutting and when the large distributors have turned to some
other product good relations must be rebuilt and expenditure incurred for the
purpose.
Thus the code of law aimed at the preservation of the prerequisites of competi-
tion is being transformed into one giving to manufacturers in imperfect competition
with each other the power to control distribution during a period of reorganization.
Within the past four years, legislatures in some thirty-one states have accepted this
policy and are at the same time endorsing the advertising that gives the manufac-
turers their power to set resale prices. The Supreme Court has merely taken the
view that if legislators are so disposed their actions are not unconstitutional.
IV. PRIcE DISCRIMINATION
A. The Shift from the Preservation of Competition between Manufacturers to the
Control of their Prices
Local and other price discriminations were among the practices of which the
early trusts were accused. They were appraised by the courts as evidence of the
intent of the seller. This approach has already been discussed. In 1914, however,
legislative prohibitions upon price discrimination were enacted in Section 2 of the
Clayton Act,2 4 which has now been replaced by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.25
In part this legislation suggests an elaboration and clarification of the Sherman Act.
But these laws go beyond the effort to preserve the prerequisites of competition
among manufacurers. They seek to avoid unfair discrimination between dis-
tributors. They rest, therefore, like resale price maintenance laws, upon the
admitted hopelessness of maintaining anything like perfect competition among man-
ufacturers. The effort to control differentials in price to buyers of different classes
rests broadly upon an attempt to adjust the prices of manufacturers to what they
might be assumed to be if there were price competition between the sellers. Failure
to prohibit price discririination between ultimate consumers suggests, however,
that the old principle lives on.26 It is hoped to preserve competition among dis-
'Supra note io'.
49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S. C. 5I3, 13a, 13b, 21a.
SThis omission may be of little practical importance. It is of interest mainly as evidence of the
survival of the old principle.
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tributors and thus to avoid control of retail prices. The effort to maintain competi-
tion between distributors, however, coupled with the great political pressure exerted
by small distributors and their suppliers who are fearful of elimination, has resulted
in severe modifications of the policy of controlling price differentials by reference to
those likely under perfect price competition. Price competition between distributors
might lead to the survival of a few large units. When the courts were earlier pre-
sented with this dilemma in the field of production they chose to pursue efficiency
even if it resulted in the weakening of competitive forces in the market. Apparently
Congress has chosen the other horn of the dilemma in dealing with the field of
distribution. The Robinson-Patman Act contains provisions likely to handicap the
development of large distributors. It rests, therefore, upon conflicting principles; it
indicates the awkward consequences of efforts to preserve the prerequisites of com-
petition; it admits the inadequacy of past efforts to preserve these prerequisites.
Discrimination has in general been prohibited under both the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts when the effect may be to lessen competition substantially
or to tend to create a monopoly27 in any line of interstate commerce. 28 These
familiar phrases suggest an effort to continue the basic policy of the Sherman Law
making clear its application to a specific practice.2 9 The prohibition of discrimina-
tion where it may lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce indicates the presence of the new principle above mentioned, namely, the
control of price differentials on the selling side of the market in the hope of main-
taining the prerequisites of competition at least on the buying side and, therefore, in
subsequent markets on the way to the ultimate buyer. This new principle was
accepted by the courts only some fifteen years after the Clayton Act was passed
and then in a case affecting discrimination between fabricators and not distributors.3"
In the cases presented to the courts between 1914 and 1929 affecting the relations
between manufacturers and the various classes of retailers the courts generally
avoided interference with the policies of sellers and assumed that, having maintained
competition between these sellers, the middlemen and the consumer had been pro-
tected. A purpose to maintain the old channels of trade was held to be illegal in
'However, the latter act has, as will be seen, amended the Clayton Act by extending its prohibitions
to cover acts the effect of which is "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition," without reference to the
substantiality of the effect upon competition or the creation of monopoly. Robinson-Patman Act, §1(a).
'This necessary restriction to interstate commerce is already producing a crop of difficulties in pending
litigation under the latter act. It is claimed that sellers peddling goods from local branch houses are not
engaged in interstate commerce. Cf. In Matter of Kraft Phenix Cheese Co., F. T. C. Dockct 2935; In
Matter of Anheuser Busch Co. F. T. C. Docket 2987. It is also claimed that differentials to retailers
if they affect competition between them affect only intrastate commerce. Cf. In Matter of Bird & Son,
Inc. and Montgomery Ward & Co., F. T. C: Docket 2937.
Continuity with the Sherman Act cases is also evident in the provision in §3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act against local discrimination "for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor in
such part of the United States" and against selling goods "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." TIhe continuity is verbal rather than one of principle,
more particularly in the Robinson-Patman Act.
'American Can Co. v. Van Camp Packing Co., George Van Camp and Sons, 278 U. S. 245 (929).
See pp. 310-311, infra.
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I914.$' In the majority of subsequent cases, however, little or no emphasis has been
placed upon this principle. The line between permissible and illegal .discrimination
has sometimes been drawn by reference to the legal forms of business organization.
It was held, for instance, that a seller may refuse to sell to a cooperative of retailers
at any price other than that charged to a single retailer. 2 He may, however, group
together for discount purposes the stores in a chain in each locality, even though
they require individual canvassing and delivery, and refuse to permit independent
retailers to pool their orders for the purpose of calculating discounts.88
In some of these and other cases the court has refused to interfere with the price
differentials of a seller on the ground. that a seller is free to select his customers8 4
The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts both explicitly preserve the right if it is
exercised in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade. Of course in a
competitive world sellers would be free to choose their own customers but they
would be unable to choose on any basis other than the price offered. Where there
were differences in the cost of different kinds of business there would be a tendency
to a normal rate of return 5 in each. Prices wobld, therefore, vary in accordance
with differences in cost. The courts, presented with evidence that conditions had
so changed that sellers found an opportunity to charge differentials not in accord-
ance with the competitive pattern, replied that one of the minor prerequisites of
competition must be maintained even though the major prerequisites were present
only in diluted form.30
The effect of discrimination upon competition among buyers received serious
attention from the courts3 7 in 1929, when they interpreted the congressional phrase
"in any line of commerce" in the conventional, and apparently obvious, sense to
include competition between those engaged in subsequent processes 8  Manufac-
'Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. U. S., 234 U. S. 6oo (914). The Association had
arranged for the reporting and circulation of the names of wholesalers who sold direct to builders and
contractors. This activity was held to be illegal partly because of the element of conspiracy and partly
because of its objective.
t'Mennen Co. v. F. T. C., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759 (923).
'F. T. C. v. National Biscuit Co., 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 6x3
(1924).
'A producer of cereals discriminating against a chain store by refusing to sell to it at its carload rate
was held not to have contravened the law. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
227 Fed. 46, 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 59i5); F. T. C. v. National Biscuit Co., supra note 33. "Effective competi-
tion requires that merchants have freedom of action in conducting their own affairs." 299 Fed. at 740.
'Rates of profit that in the absence of chaniges in conditions of demand and supply would induce no
change in the amount of resources in any line of activity.
The right of a buyer to choole his sources of merchandise has also been upheld. Raymond Bros.
Clark & Co. v. F. T. C., 263 U. S. 533 (1924). An individual wholesaler refused to buy from a seller
who sold to chain stores at wholesale prices.
'hIn Mennen Co. v. F. T. C., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759, the court
stated that it saw no evidence that "the public suffered injury or that competitors had reasonable ground
for complaint' The court admitted that discrimination by a manufacturer might lessen competition
among his customers or potential customers but decided that.Congress had not intended to prohibit this
kind of restriction upon competition. Its emphasis was upon the absence of any decline in competition
between the manufacturer and others in the same line of business.
'American Can Co. v. Van Camp Packing Co., George Van Camp and Sons, 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
A can manufacturer had sold cans and leased a sealing machine to one customer at 2o% below published
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turers were then placed in a very difficult position. Pressed by large buyers for
special prices they feared suits for restraining competition between the large buyers
and their rivals. Where was the line between a justified and an unjustified dis-
crimination? 9 The Robinson-Patman Act was intended in part to clarify the law
on this subject. It emphasized however the application of the Act to the restriction
of competition in subsequent markets by prohibiting discrimination also where it
may "injure" or "destroy" competition with the person who knowingly grants or
receives the discriminatory price or with the customers of either.40  In fact it ex-
tended the application of the law. Under the terms of the Clayton Act it had been
necessary to show a lessening of competition in an entire line of commerce.41 This
new clause prohibited discrimination resulting only in injury to competition.
The Clayton and Robinson-Patman laws do not prevent discrimination as such.
A spark plug manufacturer who sold to an automobile manufacturer at less than
cost with the object of creating a demand for replacement purposes which would
be met at higher prices was held not to have contravened the law.42  Presumably
the automobile manufacturer and the accessory dealer are not in the same line of
commerce and, therefore, the rule in the Van Camp case43 would not affect this
decision. The sale of lime at one price to farmers and another to chemical manu-
facturers would be untouched so long as the price is uniform to all farmers and to
all chemical manufacturers. Sales of coal at one price to apartment operators and
another to industrial buyers, sales of chemicals at one price to fertilizer manufacturers
and others to other buyers, or of milk at one price to distributors of fluid milk and
another to cheese manufacturers appear to fall in the same category. These policies
do not injure competition in the restricted sense in which it is defined but they are
evidence of wide departures from price competition. Such discriminations do not
occur in a competitive market. Sellers sell at the highest price offered and are as in-
different to the use to which the product 4a to be put as they are to the girth meas-
urement of buyers. Furthermore, in so far as the broad principle of competition
has been approved because of its effect upon the utilization of resources, serious
departures from this utilization occur when the seller finds it possible and profitable
to restrict the activities of farmers while encouraging those of chemical manufac-
turers.
prices which were apparently charged to its rivals. The Supreme Court in response to a question pro-
pounded by a Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Clayton Act did apply to discriminations the
effect of which was to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly on the buying side of
the market. This reversion to the words of the Clayton Act was reiterated (American Can Co. v. Ladoga
Canning Co. 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1931)) and a company
discriminated against was awarded triple damages. The contention that the discrimination was made in
good faith and to meet competition because the manufacturer feared that the buyer would make his own
cans was rejected.
These decisions also presented the problem of defining a line of business.
'Robinson-Patman Act, §i(a).
a This requirement had proved an insuperable obstacle to prosecution in most cases.
" S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th, 1ga5).
' Supra note 38.
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B. Policies of Control
i. Differentials between the Prices of Goods of Different Quality.
In the Clayton Act differentials in prices were permitted if they were "on account
of differences in the grade, quality or quantity."4 Whether the Act imposed any
limit upon differences in price in these circumstances was never clarified. The
Robinson-Patman Act narrows the scope of prohibition upon discrimination because
it relates only to sales of goods "of like grade and quality. '45 The significance of
this change depends upon the manner in which the courts define grade and quality.
The definition is important although far from easy. If differences in brand name
justify differences in price special brands may be made for each class of buyer and
the manufacturer may combine the production of his own with private brands. But
if, as is generally assumed_, Usis basis of differentiation is not allowed 40 there may be
a reor9,n:n..,ion of production. The production of private brands may be concen-
-. Led in firms not selling under their own brand name. Manufacturers with brand
names of their own may be compelled to seek forceful methods of increasing the
sales of their own brand to make up for the loss of manufacturing business for the
owners of private brand names. Large buyers may be impelled to seek purchases
of the whole output of some. manufacturers; no charges of discrimination can then
arise. 47 These manufacturers, if they are in industries where relatively small scale
production survives, may be placed in a position of complete dependence upon the
single large buyer. Loss of the contract in any year would leave them without any
business. Their power to protect themselves against such an eventuality depends
very much upon the conditions prevailing in the industry and especially upon the
existence of excess capacity.
Rejection of brands as a basis of discrimination may lead to a physical differentia-
tion of products until their differences are sufficient for the courts to accept them as
not of like grade and quality. Manufacturing costs may thus be raised. In the
chemical industries it may be possible to make products offering similar utility but
of different physical constitution. They may sell one to large buyers and another
to smaller at price differentials giving considerable benefit .to the large buyers.
Sellers still have the right to select their own customers in bona fide transactions and
not in restraint of trade.
2. Differentials between Prices for Different Quantities.
Differences in the cost of selling or transportation justified differences in price
under the Clayton Act if they made only "due allowance" for such differences in
cost.48 The Robinson-Patman Act includes in this type of restriction differences in
cost due to differences in quantities sold It permits differentials that make only
"Clayton Act, 52. "Robinson-Patman Act, §z(a).
4'Differences due to the cost of advertising their own brands would appear to be permissible. See p.
314, iifra-
1 Cf. Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8442, H. R. 4995, H. R. o62
(Amendment of Clayton Act) 7 4 th Cong., Ist SeW. (x935), p. 19.
'Clayton Act, 12. 'Robinson-Patman Act, 51(a).
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due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture sale or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities50 by which such commodities are sold or
delivered. The most notable aspect of this provision is that it apparently permits a
manufacturer to refuse discounts equal to differences in cost arising out of differences
in quantity sold or methods of sale.5 ' If, as is likely, the Act is so interpreted it
cannot be defended as a means of achieving in the sale of manufactured goods the
results of competition. Sellers may discriminate in favor of but not against the
firms with whom dealing is more costly. Such a policy cannot be defended on the
ground that the law is being modified merely to remove the unfair advantages of
large firms.
This same of policy permitting discrimination against large buyers appears to be
implied in the provision in the Robinson-Patman Act permitting government control
of price differentials.5 1" ' The irtroduction of direct control is itself notable as
representing a shift toward direct control of price policy. Where the Federal Trade
Commission finds that "available purchasers in greater quantities" of particular
commodities or classes of commodities "are so few as to render differentials on ac-
count thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly5 2 in any line of
commerce" the Commission may "after due investigation and hearing of all in-
terested parties, fix and establish quantity limits and revise the same as it finds neces-
sary." But under what circumstances would differentials making "due allowance" for
differences in quantity purchased be unjustly discriminatory? If the differentials
do not exceed the differences in cost referred to above why interfere merely because
only a few firms can qualify for them? The second ruling phrase is "promotive of
monopoly." Here again the legislature was face to face with the inconvenient tend-
ency of an individualism that encourages the survival of the fittest to destroy, by
that very fact, the mechanism for the future selection of the fittest. In giving to the
Commission power to fix maximum discounts under these conditions an attempt is
made to limit the size of firms in the distributing industry so as to prevent the
emergence of monopoly, however that may be defined. The power is given ap-
parently in defiance of the possibility that the large firm is increasing in size beciuse
of its superior efficiency. Congress seeks to modify the dictum of the Supreme
Court that "the law does not make mere size an offense"' 8 by adding "except in the
field of distribution" Regulation of the size of firms by way of the regulation of
the prices they pay for their materials can, of course, be a far more powerful means
of control in the field of distribution than in the field of manufacturing. What size
Sellers customarily classify their buyers into a few groups for the purpose of calculating discounts.
Even where they are classified according to the size of orders there is some discrimination. It is doubtful,
however, whether the courts will insist on separate prices for orders of each size.
'Hearings, supra note 47, P. 1o. " Robinson-Patman Act, §S (a).
" The standard, "unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly," may be held to be so lacking in
precision and definiteness as to render the provision an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power if
the Court continues to utilize the principle--apparently discovered in the "hot oil" case (Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (x935)).
0U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451 (1go).
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of firm will be the maximum permissible? When the Supreme Court has sought
to restore competition by partitioning large firms held to be in breach of the law
it has substituted in some cases three or four firms. Will the Commission be guided
in the administration of this uncomfortable power by the precedent set by the Court,
and how much protection will the consumer thereby secure? Can sellers whose
opportunities for increasing their relative volume of business are cut off by Congress
be regarded as vigorously competing with each other to the benefit of the buyer?
3. Differentials due to Differences in the Cost of Selling.
The allowance of price differentials to cover differences in the cost of selling
will presumably recognize advertising costs as a justification for differentials. Neither
the Congress nor the courts have taken action to curtail expenditure upon advertising
although, as is explained above, such expenditures are in large part a substitute
for price competition as a way of obtaining business. They seriously interfere with
competition in the market and tend to raise costs.
4. Differentials "to Meet Competition."
Discrimination in good faith and to meet competition was permitted in the
Clayton Act 4 and the Robinson-Patman Act makes little change in this respect."
This provision implies the possibility that discrimination may occur in defiance of
the law and permits others to follow suit if some seller has started it. This attitude
may be realistic but it creates difficulties. May a seller discriminate when he honestly
believes he is responding to a similar policy on the part of a rival? Moreover the
patterns of discrimination existing on the day the law came into force can all be
defended by individual sellers under this clause. So long as these price differentials
are unchanged they may be beyond the reach of the law."6 If a seller supplies
superior facilities rivals may respond with a lower price. 7 It would appear to be
necessary, therefore, to determine how much difference between the prices of com-
petitors may be justified by any difference of facilities.
5. Discrimination and Changes in Price.
The Robinson-Patman Act introduces a new provision that the Act shall not
prevent price changes from time to time in response to "changing conditions affect-
ing the market for, or the marketability of, the goods concerned.""8 Sellers faced
with the deterioration of goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, or those discontinuing
business may make price reductions- without breach of the law. Congress was
"Clayton Act, §2.
'The Act, §i(b), provides that any seller may rebut a prima ade case of illegal discrimination by
showing that "his lower price or the furnishing of facilities or services to any purchaser or purchasers was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor."
r' The Act may have the effect of permitting differentials in excess of cost differentials. If one firm
can show cost differentials justifying certain discounts others may apparently grant the discounts without
being able to achieve the economies on which they are based.
" Cf. Answer to Complaint, In Matter of Shefford Cheese Co., F. T. C. Docket 2936. 'The Company
defended part of its discounts on the ground that it did not deliver at the store door while its rivals did.
'Robinson-Patman Act, §1(a).
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probably fearful that prices might be reduced for a short time to accept a large
order and subsequently raised again. But if prices charged at different times are to
be compared serious problems are likely to occur. How long a period of time is to
be taken? Ultimately this question leads to the necessity of deciding what "chang-
ing conditions affecting the market" justify a price change and how large a change
they justify.r9 At this point apparently the policy has been transformed into one of
price control.
6. Differentials in Services or Allowances.
The Robinson-Patman Act seeks to deal with some of the possible discrimina-
tions in matters other than price but having similar effects. It was alleged that large
distributors had benefitted from advertising and brokerage allowances. 60 The large
distributors explained that it would be uneconomical t9 make them purchase through
brokers whose services they did not need, and whose charges would be added to
their costs."I Such a policy would merely protect antiquated methods of distribu-
tion. Brokerage payments of this kind were, nevertheless, prohibited. 2 This clause,
however, merely prevents large buyers from obtaining part of the economies of
their size in the form of fictional brokerage payments. They must seek them all
in the form of price differEnces which must meet the requirements already laid
down.
Advertising allowances were defended by the large sellers as a modern method
of promoting sales.63 One large chain was reported to have received advertising
allowances from one manufacturer amounting to eight million dollars in one year,
of which six million dollars are said to have been spent by the buyer on advertis-
ing.6 4 Allowances had also been made for window dressing although they had not
necessarily been so applied.65  The Act does not forbid such allowances or limit
them to the cost of advertising service rendered by buyers; it merely requires that
thiev shill be made upon a "proportionally equal" basis to all buyers. 66 It gives no
indication of the basis of calculating proportionality.
67
' Cf. Answer to Complaint, In Matter of Bird & Son, Inc. and Montgomery Ward & Co., F. T. C.
Docket 2937. Montgomery Ward denied knowledge whether the seller's price changes had been made in
good faith in response to changing conditions in the market.
0 5Hearings, supra note 47, pp. 6, 69, 96, 183. 'Id. at pp. 148, 184.
The Act, §s (c), makes it illegal to grant or accept anything of value as a commission, brokerage
or allowance except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase. Brokerage payments
may not be made to intermediaries unless they are under the control of the person paying the commission.
'Hearings, supra note 47, at pp. 149, 177. See also charges of payments of advertising allowances
by razor blade manufacturers contended by the Federal Trade Commission to be in violation of §2 of the
Clayton Act. N. Y. Times, April at, 1936, p. 47. "4Hearings, supra note 47, at p. 6r.
Id. at F. 82. It has been stated that in .1935 department, dry goods and speciaty 'tores spent :a12,-
ooo.noo for general publicity, of which $536,u0o,ooo was spent for newspaper pub!, ty. Manufacturers
are said to have contributed about $5,000,000 towards the cost of this publicity. N. 1'. Times, Aug. 16,
1930, §3, P. 8. '
' The Act, §x (d), forbids paynicots by a seller for the benefit of a customer as compensation for facili-
tie, or services furnished by the customer in connection with the processing, handling or sale unless such a
consideration is made available "on proportionately equal terms to all ther customers competing in the
distribution of such products."
'Some distributors, after temporarily abandoning advertising allowances, are reported again to have
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C. The Efects of Control
i. Upon the Organization of Distribution.
The effect of the Robinson-Patman Act upon the struggle between the competing
types of distributor depends partly upon the policy of the Federal Trade Commission
in fixing maximum discounts and the attitude of the courts to its policy. Upon this
subject there is little to say. So far as discounts may be allowed up to the differences
in the cost of dealing with different types of distributors the pressures will probably
be similar to those affecting resale price maintenance and there will be a tendency
for manufacturers to favor the small distributors, subject, however, to important
checks already mentioned. So far as large distributors secure the full benefits of
the economies of their method of distributing their discounts will depend upon the
amount of the economies involved. In the first place, there will be general pressure
upon manufacturers to calculate costs in order to have evidence on this subject. This
pressure will reveal the arbitrariness of many conventional allocations of costs. It is
not inconceivable that it will be found in some cases that the large buyers have been
"carrying" the smaller, i.e., that larger discounts could be given to the larger firms
without contravening the law. Discounts based upon the contention that a single
large order raises the rate of operation of plant more than a small order appear to
have been regarded in Congress 8 as undesirable. In so far as the loss of a large
order necessitates obtaining a number of small orders in order to maintain the rate
of operation, and the cost of obtaining these small orders may be higher than that
of obtaining the large order, differences in price would be justified by differences in
the cost of selling. But, as a number of small orders can raise the rate of operation
as effectively as a large one of an amount equal to the aggregate of the small orders,
the manufacturing costs in the one case are the same as in the other. Neither the
large nor the small orders can legitimately be singled out to bear the burden of the
initial costs of running the plant at all.
Large orders for future delivery may well justify lower prices. If they permit
production during "off peak" periods they may enable a plant to maintain an
average rate of operation over a period of time higher than would otherwise be
possible. The total amount of resources necessary to produce a given total output
is less when the plant is operated regularly than when it is operated irregularly 9
demanded them but to have required in their' purchase contracts an avowal that the manufacturer is
prepared to make similar arrangements with other purchasers similarly situated and on proportionately
equal terms. While the buyer, as well as the seller, is responsible for any breach of this clause the buyer
can know whether breach has been committed only if he knows the prices charged by the sellers to all
his rivals and also the meaning of the phrase "proportionally equal." The avowal demanded of the
seller is sought as a means of defense in this difficult situation. N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1936, p. 37. The
position of advertising allowances made in an entirely separate contract is dubious.
'sHearings, supra note 47, P. 1o.
The Federal Trade Commission complained that the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company had dis-
criminated in favor of a large mail order house in contraventiod of the Clayton Act. The contract with
the mail order house provided for a large minimum annual purchase of tires over a period of years.
These tires were sold by the mail order house under its own brand names. Those sold to dealers were
sold under the manufacturer's brand which he advertised. Until wide publicity was given by the Federal
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yet the resulting economies fall to those able to give large orders and the large
distributors may continue to obtain better prices than do smaller buyers. 70 The
social advantages of this method of organizing production are undeniable although
its consequences in terms of the survival of a small number of large distributors
may be disliked. Discounts based merely upon the total amount of purchases
during a given period would, however, be difficult to justify. If the large buyer
purchases upon a hand-to-mouth basis his demands may be as spasmodic as those
of small buyers and occur at the same time.
2. Effects upon the Price Policies of Manufacturers.
The policy of controlling discrimination may affect the general level of prices
charged by manufacturers. The law appears to hamper if not abolish secret price
cutting. A sale to one buyer at less than the "regular" price could be argued to
injure the competition between rivals who paid the regular price and the buyer at
the cut price. Such price cutting may not be defensible in terms of differences in
the cost of manufacture or delivery. It does not necessarily favor the largest buyers.
Where manufacturers are relatively few, and overhead costs an important part of
total costs, there is constantly anxiety to prevent secret price cutting. Secret price
cutting by one seller causes rivals to lose business and they resort to similar price
cuts. The market becomes "chaotic" in the sense that there is no uniformity of
prices and a price war is likely. On the other hand, a manufacturer carrying over-
head costs is often tempted to obtain business by making a secret concession from
his regular price. An open reduction involves a loss of revenue upon all his other
business and this loss may exceed the beneficial effect of the additional business,
allowance being made for the out-of-pocket costs of executing the order. But if
the concession is made upon one or a few orders the gain may exceed the out-of-
pocket cost of the business. There is no economy in a policy of throwing industry
into price wars and little possibility of doing so. But the importance of secret price
cuts lies in their tendency to operate as an entering wedge for open price reductions.
Trade Commission, the majority of purchasers were doubtless unaware of the origin of the tires of the
mail order house. The Commission ordered the discontinuance of discrimination "by selling at net
realized prices which are lower than the net realized prices at which it sells tires of comparable grade and
quality to retail dealers and other customers." Matter of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., F. T. C. Docket
2116 (1936) The Commission claimed that the discrimination made more than due allowance for the
cost of selling or transportation and was not made on account of differences in grade quality or quantity
sold. It emphasized that the discrimination had been kept secret from other purchasers from the manufac-
turer, thus suggesting doubt as to whether they represented only the economies resulting from the scale
of the purchase. Competition had been substantially restrained between the mail order houses ind other
distributors of tires, and the contract tended to create a monopoly in the distribution of tires. In its order,
however, it ignored differenccs in the cost of manufacturing or of selling as well as differences in quantity
as justifying price differentials. The Company announced the abrogation of the contract on account of
the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. It also announced that it would appeal from the decision of the
Commission concerning its operations prior to the change in law, N. Y. Times, July 17, 5936, p. 30.
" Chains often buy farther ahead than do small buyers. Hearings, supra note 47, Pp. 23, 24. As large
buyers buy for longer future delivery than the small the price charged on the day of the contract for
immediate delivery to small buyers may be more than that for future delivery for large buyers. Similarly
the price on the day of delivery may differ between the two classes.
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In imperfectly competitive markets they indicate an imperfect foresight of sellers
which supplies a downward pressure on prices. If secret price cutting is eliminated
sellers act upon the assumption that any reduction in price made by them will be
immediately met by all rivals. They think in terms of the total demand at each
price, ie., as a monopolist, although possibly limited by the fear of new competition
resulting either in a cutting of prices or a wider sharing of the market at existing
prices. The sellers draw the line between a desirable and an undesirable price cut
but their standards of desirability frequently depart from the general social interest.
The elimination of secret price cutting, therefore, increases the imperfection of
competition.
Downward pressures upon prices are also reduced by attempts to obstruct large
buyers who are said to beat down the prices of manufacturers without mercy. Mercy
of course found no place in the freely competitive market. How low can prices be
forced? It may be said that the large order is a great temptation to the seller.
Why? If it is because it saves the cost of obtaining a large number of small orders
the Act does not remove the temptation. But a manufacturer may accept a low price
because he has become dependent upon the large buyer; he may have allowed his
selling organization to shrink and have relied upon continued orders from the large
firm. Turning to small orders means incurring the initial costs of entering an alter-
native market. But this situation may even be encouraged under the law because a
manufacturer selling his whole output to a single buyer is immune from the Act.
The large buyer may obtain low prices because of the low rate at which capacity is
being operated in the manufacturing industry. Any price above the out-of-pocket
costs of new business yields a contribution towards overhead costs. The prospect of
a large block of business promises a large aggregate contribution, although the
contribution per unit of output may be low. In the absence of pressure from large
buyers manufacturers in many industries where overhead costs are important have
shown a preference for meeting a decline in demand by maintaining prices and
allowing output to fall. The quantitative amount of the fall in output due to the
maintenance of prices varies of course from industry to industry and with the period
of time in view. In so far as plants not used become obsolescent, rust out, involve
costs for maintenance or increased interest charges, additional costs are imposed on
the industry and upon society without corresponding benefit. The large buyer may,
therefore, be a means of overpowering the sellers and preventing them from pursuing
this policy. At the present stage in the evolution of distribution and prior to the
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act there was probably vigorous enough rivalry
between distributors to ensure that the benefits of these downward pressures upon
prices were passed on to ultimate purchasers. There looms in the future, however,
the possibility that distributors may become so large and so few that the pressure
to pass on these benefits may be seriously modified.
These problems are particularly acute in times of depression. Freedom to large
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distributors to press down manufacturers as far as they are able may cause the
elimination of firms. Productive resources which society would have been well
advised to keep in use in order to meet a later increase in general demand may be
abandoned. Their abandonment necessitates the investment of new capital when
the upturn of business comes, possibly stimulating the upswing of general -business
activity. This situation is extremely complex and the analysis necessary to provide a
basis for a proper policy is not available. In the first place the pressing down of
prices, if general, may restrict the depth of the downward swing in industrial activity
and indirectly reduce the prospect of the elimination of firms. In the second place,
the failure of firms does not always involve the abandonment of plant. It may con-
tinue in production with a lower capitalization. In the third place it is always
difficult to determine the amount of investment that should be retained in an in-
dustry to meet the upturn of business. The amount and time of the upturn are
always uncertain. The obstruction of the development of large distributors and the
elimination of secret price cutting is likely, however, to have the general effect of
strengthening manufacturers in their efforts to maintain prices, thus reducing output
and possibly intensifying depression.
V. CONCLUSION
It is abundantly evident that the policy of maintaining the prerequisites of com-
petition, either in the narrow theoretical sense or even in a somewhat broader interpre-
tation, has failed to attain its objective. If mere unfairness in the policies of the
larg; firms71 is the explanation of the decline of price competition, the modifications
that have been introduced into the law by the anti-trust laws have until now failed to
maintain competitive markets in many industries. The more plausible explanation
of the increasing imperfection of competition is that it is due to changes in the
techniques of production and selling. In some of the branches of heavy industry
the economies of large scale production, coupled with the fact that markets are
narrower than the national boundaries are sufficient to explain the imperfections of
competition.
In choosing whether to maintain the number of firms at a competitive level or to
accept the economies of size and with them a decreasing number of firms, the courts
have in general chosen the latter alternative. In the sale of consumers goods the
other major change accounting for the size of firms lies in the development of
methods of sales promotion. Neither the courts nor Congress have adequately.
recognized the tendency of this development to damage the market by dividing it
into a series of sub-markets for specially branded products. Even when contemplat-
ing the policies of sellers powerful enough to seek to maintain resale prices, and
'The pursuit of profit is sometimes the basis of criticism of large firms, although such conduct is of
the essence of capitalism. An important aspect of price policy in the steel industry has been condemned
as "a network of actions by individuals and groups motivated by the desire for larger profits and acting
vithout regard for the interests of other industries or the consuming public:' Fetter, Plannin' for
Totalitarian Monopoly (937) 45 J. PoL.. Eco-z. 102.
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thereby restrict price competition in later markets, or to set discounts favoring one
class of distributor rather than another, the courts failed to be impressed by the
extent to which such sellers have been emancipated from competitive pressures. The
courts have looked back to the picture of a competitive world and refused to inter-
fere because the seller must have power to select his customers, or even for more
formal reasons. In its recent legislation Congress appears to endorse price differ-
entials allowing the seller to seek to recover the cost of advertising his goods. To do
otherwise would undoubtedly cause serious dislocation of business but to proceed
thus is not to maintain the prerequisites of competition. States have enacted resale
price maintenance legislation which -will have similar effects.
In the threefold struggle that has developed between the sellers of advertised
goods, the small scale distributors and the large scale distributors, federal and state
governments have been under pressure to obstruct the development of large dis-
tributors. Those threatened with ejection from their positions in the market and in
part also manufacturers seeking to maintain powerful positions by advertising, have
exerted great pressure. They have not sought to eliminate only the unfair advantages
of large distributors. Taxes against chain stores are an obstacle to one kind of large
scale distribution arbitrary in amount. Progressive taxes on gross sales also hamper
large firms. The bias against large distributors in the Robinson-Patman Act has
already been mentioned. Thus, although anti-trust laws have failed to maintain the
numbers of manufacturers there appears now to be an effort to restrict concentration
in distribution, a process of relatively recent occurrence. But in the process of doing
so not only is the pursuit of the economies of large scale distribution hindered.
Price competition between manufacturers is softened and they exercise control over
the reorganization of distribution.
The type of case coming before the courts and the situations with which Con-
gress endeavors to deal all suggest how far competition has receded in a number
of markets. Efforts to rearrange the scenery so that competition could commence
and continue would involve far reaching changes likely to induce drastic opposition
from business and the courts and to offer the ultimate purchaser little if any benefit.
In fact the control of price differentials is a step in the direction of a policy of seek-
ing the ends of competition by social control. This policy leads on toward increasing
state control. Maintaining the number of distributors beyond the economical num-
ber does not give the buyer the benefits of competition. The difficulties and dangers
of control of prices are difficult to exaggerate. There may be ways of permitting a
wide decentralization of economic initiative and yet securing the orientation of the
economic system toward reasonably acceptable social objectives and its reasonably
efficient operation. Unless such policies are speedily discovered we face the moun-
tainous probleme of price control.
